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ABSTRACT 
 
The effect of competition on quality in home health care is not well understood, 
especially given extensive entry regulation. We analyze the universe of hospital 
discharges during 2006 for Medicare beneficiaries (about 4.5 million) and a subset of 
522,232 transitions from hospitals to home health agencies to determine whether there is 
a significant difference in home health utilization, hospital readmission rates, and health 
care expenditures in states with and without entry regulation. We identify these effects by 
looking across regulated and non-regulated states within Hospital Referral Regions, 
which characterize well-defined health care markets and frequently cross state 
boundaries. We find entry regulation in home health to result in lower resource intensity, 
yet similar rates of hospital readmission for patients admitted to home health. 
Nevertheless, entry restrictions substantially lowered the use of home health and 
increased overall hospital readmissions with little or no effect on overall health care 
expenditures.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The effect of competition on quality in health care markets is not well understood. While 
the evidence generally points to a positive relationship between competition and quality, 
especially under regulated prices, the quality of care implications of policies aiming to 
slow the growth of health care costs by limiting firm entry and thus competition are 
unclear.  One such policy tool is Certificate of Need (CON) laws designed to provide 
states with control over entry, expansions, and substantial capital investments by health 
care facilities. Since the effectiveness of CON laws in restricting utilization is disputed, 
there is large variation across states in the degree of regulatory oversight.  
 
CON laws exist for various types of health care providers including hospitals, nursing 
homes, rehabilitation centers and home health agencies.  CON for hospitals and to a 
lesser extent for nursing homes and rehabilitation centers give state governments the 
authority to restrict major capital investment such as the construction of new facilities, 
expansions to existing ones, and the purchasing of expensive technology (MHCC, 2001). 
Hence, CON imposes restrictions on both incumbent hospitals and potential entrants. 
This is not the case in home health, a labor intensive industry with no major capital 
investment, where CON operates exclusively as a mechanism to restrict entry of new 
home health agencies.  With fewer agencies in CON markets, state regulators may be 
more effective at having a positive influence on standardizing the care delivered by the 
home health agencies in their state.  However, restricted entry leads to markets with 
fewer providers and, thus, reduced market competition among agencies.  In a market with 
4 
 
regulated prices, such as in home health, reduced competition may have a negative effect 
on the quality of home health care delivered. 
 
On the other hand, CON for home health may also influence the rate of hospital 
discharges to home health.  With evidence that effective use of home health care services 
can lower the rate of hospital readmissions (Sochalski, et al. 2009, Naylor, et al. 2004, 
Kane, et al. 2000, Penrod, et al. 1998, Penrod, Kane and Kane 2000, Hadley, et al. 2000), 
understanding the role of CON for home health can have broad health care implications. 
In particular, if there are fewer hospital discharges to home health in CON states and 
admissions to home health contribute to lower rates of rehospitalization, CON for home 
health may have important downstream effects on health care system rehospitalization 
rates and expenditures.    
 
There are two main objectives of this paper.  First, we will evaluate whether there are 
significant differences in the delivery of home health care between states with and 
without entry regulation in terms of the resource intensity of home health services and the 
quality of home health care among patients discharged to home health.  Second, we will 
describe the broader implications of such regulations in terms of the rate of hospital 
discharge to home health care, overall hospital readmissions, and total health care 
expenditures.   
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BACKGROUND 
Hospital expansion in the 1970s, associated with excess bed capacity (Joskow 1980) and 
reduced social welfare (Robinson and Luft 1985), led to the 1974 Federal Health 
Planning and Resources Development Act, which mandated states to develop CON to 
control utilization and third-party expense by controlling or reducing supply. When states 
universally adopted CON for hospitals in the 1970s, 38 states also applied CON 
regulation to the home health care sector.  When the federal mandate was repealed in 
1987, only 18 states continued active CON regulations for home health care (AHPA 
2005, MHCC 2001).   
 
The idea behind CON regulation was that it would prevent unnecessary duplication of 
services and ensure appropriate care by concentrating the location of sophisticated 
medical services to high-volume regional facilities with sufficient expertise and resources 
(Smith-Mello 2004).  Proponents of CON laws view restrictions on acquisitions and 
expansions of hospitals as a way to achieve this goal (Ho 2004). Nevertheless, evidence 
on the effectiveness of CON in lowering hospital costs of care, procedure volume and 
mortality is mixed (Salkever 2000, Popescu, Vaughan-Sarrazin and Rosenthal 2006, Ho 
2006, Ho, Ku-goto and Jollis 2009).  
 
In home health markets, with little to no capital investment (CMS 2003) and labor as the 
dominating input, the potential for cost savings from major capital expansions by 
incumbent agencies is nonexistent.  Furthermore, there is no evidence of a volume-
outcome relationship which would be needed for a home health CON to enhance quality 
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(Kass 1987).  In home health, service delivery is decentralized and provided by 
individuals as opposed to teams; therefore individual-nurse volume is more relevant for 
outcomes than agency volume. However, since nurses tend to work at full capacity even 
in small-scale agencies, there is little rationale for concentrating volume at a small 
number of agencies through entry restrictions.  An alternative rationale for CON 
programs in home health is that they can enforce appropriate standards of care through 
enhanced ability to monitor agencies.  However, to date there is no evidence to suggest 
CON in home health care is quality enhancing.  
 
While the effect of CON on quality of home health care is not clear, the ability for CON 
regulations to effectively limit entry of new agencies into the market is evident.  Most 
states with CON regulations follow specific policies and guidelines for the approval of 
additional home health agencies in a given market, but in practice new agencies are rarely 
approved. Therefore, markets in CON-regulated states are not contested, as incumbent 
agencies are not threatened by potential entrants.1  Figure 1 characterizes the market for 
home health by CON status in 2006.  CON states have almost half the number of 
agencies for their Medicare population (14.6 vs. 28.2 per 100,000 Medicare beneficiaries) 
and are therefore more concentrated as measured by an agency-specific Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) (3,964 vs. 2,745).2    
 
                                                 
1 These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, New 
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and District of 
Columbia. 
2 The Agency-HHI measures the degree of concentration for each agency in our sample. Competitive 
markets are defined separately for each agency based on a weighted average of the agency’s market 
concentration in the zip-codes of the clients they serve (zip-code level HHIs are calculated by squaring the 
market share of each firm competing in the zip-code and then summing the resulting numbers). 
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The price of a home health episode is fixed by Medicare through a Prospective Payment 
System (PPS) for home health services.3  Under PPS, a single payment is given for a 60-
day episode of care, with payment for additional 60-day episodes if the patient is 
recertified for continuing home health care. The reimbursement amount is a per-episode 
fixed rate set at admission according to the severity of the patient's condition.  To 
determine severity, each Medicare episode is classified into one of 80 mutually exclusive 
severity groups, called Home Health Resource Groups (HHRGs), which determine the 
payment rate.  Each episode payment is adjusted for differences in labor costs across 
geographic areas.4 Since prices are regulated, providers can no longer compete for 
patients based on price of services and instead must compete for patients on other 
dimensions of their services such as resource intensity or quality of care.  If the regulated 
price is set above marginal cost for some baseline level of quality, then firms will 
continue to improve service delivery to try to attract more of the available pool of 
patients until marginal cost of delivering care equals the regulated price.  Thus, economic 
theory suggests that market competition in the presence of regulated prices can lead to 
quality improvements (Beitia 2003, Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume 2006, Brekke, 
Nuschler and Straume 2007, Calem and Rizzo 1995, Karlsson 2007, Gravelle and 
Masiero 2000, Gravelle 1999, Lyon 1999, Wolinsky 1997, Ma and Burgess 1993, Allen 
and Gertler 1991, Held and Pauly 1983, Pope 1989). 
 
                                                 
3 Medicare payments to home health are $20 billion annually and represent about 80% of payments to 
home health for post-acute home care. Medicare beneficiaries who are determined by a doctor to have a 
medical need for skilled care of limited duration in the home can qualify for coverage of home health 
services on a part-time or “intermittent” basis. This type of home health care comprises a set of services 
provided in the home, most often by registered nurses, rehabilitative therapists, social workers, or home 
health aides (CMS, 2002).   
4 While, in general, the amount of service provided does not affect the amount of reimbursement, certain 
extremely high-cost episodes receive outlier payments. 
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Most empirical studies of the relationship between competition and quality under 
regulated prices found more competition to result in higher quality (as measured by lower 
mortality)(Kessler and McClellan 2000, Gowrisankaran and Town 2003, Held and Pauly 
1983, Kessler and Geppert 2005, Tay 2003, Sari 2002, Shen 2003, Shorten and Hughes 
1988).  
 
While the effect of market concentration on quality has been studied extensively in the 
hospital sector, this relationship has received no attention in the home health care 
industry.  The case of competition in a hospital market will not necessarily apply to home 
health.  Unlike hospitals, where location provides a degree of market power, home health 
agencies deliver services at the patient’s residence. Without location as a natural barrier 
to competition, we might expect home health markets to be a highly competitive.  
Similarly, unlike hospitals and other facilities that require major capital investments in 
order to become operational, home health care is labor intensive and is expected to be 
highly competitive absent of entry regulation. 
 
However, states have imposed an artificial barrier on the number of competitors in a 
given market by restricting the creation of new home health agencies through CON 
regulation.  While regulation may be more effective with fewer agencies to regulate, the 
limited number of evidence-based standards of care in home health on which effective 
service regulation can be based suggests that market competition may provide a superior 
(self-enforcing) mechanism for promoting quality. With CON regulation creating 
potentially opposing effects on quality, the net effect becomes an empirical question.   
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Moreover, home health care is part of a larger health care system. More resource 
intensive home care may increase its use by hospital discharge planners, who would 
otherwise be sending the patient home (without home health care). If home health 
agencies are effective at preventing rehospitalization for the marginal patient they serve, 
increased use may reduce overall rehospitalization rates and thus offset Medicare’s costs 
of increased home health expenditures.  Therefore, the effect of competition for home 
health care on overall health care expenditures is ambiguous.  
 
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
Following Gaynor (2006), we base our empirical specification on the equilibrium level of 
quality (in a market with regulated prices). We assume that firms either maximize profit 
or rely on surplus to support other objectives (e.g., a nonprofit agency could have a 
different objective, yet rely on surplus to achieve it (Lakdawalla and Philipson 2006, 
David 2009)). In addition, we assume that a welfare-maximizing regulator and utility-
maximizing consumers imperfectly observe the quality of home health services.   
 
 
The equilibrium level of firm quality becomes 
 
  ))(),(),(,( **** qdemandqmsqcpfq   
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where p is the administratively set price per home health episode, c is the cost of a home 
health episode at quality level *q , and ms is the firm’s market share.  The right hand side 
variables are a function of *q  because the quality level chosen by an agency is likely to 
affect its market share, cost, and willingness-to-pay for its services.  That is, higher 
quality firms will have higher costs, but at the same time are likely to attract more 
customers, which in turn would lead to commanding a higher market share.  To estimate 
quality with independent right hand side variables, we replace the endogenous variables 
with their exogenous determinants and estimate a reduced form equation.  We replace 
cost with cost shifters, demand with demand shifters, and measures of competition with 
CON regulation for home health agencies.   
 
Thus the econometric specification is: 
 
* ( , , , , )q f p CS DS CON   
 
where CS and DS are cost and demand shifters respectively. Price is the fixed Medicare 
price; cost shifters include market level variables that might influence factor prices such 
as wages, patient-agency distance, availability of labor, and density of customer base; 
demand shifters include patient-level variables that characterize patient illness severity 
and service needs as well as market-level variables that capture general service demand. 
 
Of concern here is remaining omitted variables that could be correlated with CON and 
independently influence our quality indicators.  The two most important are unobserved 
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patient characteristics such as illness severity and unobserved area-level characteristics 
such as geographic variation in service use.  If competition affects the severity of the 
patients admitted to the home health agency, unobserved severity (i.e., severity that is not 
captured by the risk adjustment) may be an issue if it independently influences the 
resource intensity of home health service use and health outcomes. This may occur if 
home health agencies that face less competitive pressure are more likely to refuse 
complicated cases and hence, attract low-severity cases on average. Geographic variation 
may be an issue if those areas that are more likely to have CON are the same areas that 
are more likely to otherwise utilize more health care services.  
 
We address both of these concerns with a specification that includes market-level fixed 
effects (υm).   
*
i CS i DS i CON s m iq CS DS CON            
 
This specification is identified by the markets (m) that include parts of multiple states (s) 
when those multiple states vary in their CON status.  We used the Dartmouth Atlas for 
Health Care's Hospital Referral Region (HRR) (Wennberg et al. 2004) as the market of 
interest because it defines a contiguous locality within which most tertiary hospital care 
referrals are contained and because it is the area most linked to geographic variation. Our 
focus on clinical outcomes for patients discharged from and readmitted to hospitals 
makes HRRs a natural geographic unit for defining markets.  Approximately 13% of 
patients in our sample reside in 32 HRRs (10%) that cross state boundaries where CON 
rules are different. These HRRs are well spread across the U.S. in that they are in 32 of 
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the 48 states in the analysis and 14 of the 18 CON states.  Figure 2 illustrates the source 
of our identification for the case of Pennsylvania, a non-CON state, in which 9 of 17 
HRRs cross state boundaries. Six of these HRRs cross into CON states (New Jersey, New 
York, and West Virginia).  Our main specification essentially reduces to a comparison of 
patients in states under CON regulation and patients in states under no entry regulation 
within hospital referral regions that cross state lines. This within-HRR variation excludes 
fixed unobserved factors tied to competition within HRRs and differential patterns of 
health care service use across HRRs. 
 
METHODS 
Data Sources 
We constructed a data set uniquely suited for this study by linking the 100% Medicare 
Provider Analysis and Review (MedPAR)5 file to the Medicare Home Health Agency 
SAF (HHA-SAF)6 file for 2005 and 2006. These data contain diagnoses, procedures, 
dates of admission and discharge, expenditures, and basic demographic information.  The 
HHA-SAF also includes detailed home health utilization information such as the number 
and type of visits (skilled nursing care, home health aides, physical therapy, speech 
therapy, occupational therapy, and medical social services).  We augmented our data with 
county-level market characteristics from the Area Resource File and hospital-level 
characteristics from the American Hospital Association (AHA) file for 2005 and 2006.  
 
 
                                                 
5 The MedPAR file contains claims data for Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries admitted to 
Medicare-certified inpatient hospitals and skilled nursing facilities (SNF). 
6 The HHA-SAF contains claims data for Medicare home health admissions. 
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Study Sample 
We define our study population as fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries over 65.5 
enrolled in Medicare between July 2005 and December 2006.7  We define our study 
sample based on index hospitalizations which includes all hospitalizations except those 
preceded by an acute or post-acute care stay in the 90 days prior to the hospitalization.  
The focus on index hospitalizations in order to focus our analysis on patterns of care 
following relatively new health events rather than patterns of care heavily influenced by 
ongoing treatment in existing episodes of care. The sample includes hospitalizations in 
fiscal year 2006 (October 2005 – September 2006) in acute care hospitals in the 48 
contiguous states. 
 
We construct two study samples from these index hospitalizations.  Our primary sample 
is based on home health admissions, consisting of 522,232 index hospitalizations that are 
followed within 3 days of the hospital discharge date by a home health admission.  Our 
secondary sample is based on hospital discharge and is comprised of all index 
hospitalizations that lead to a hospital discharge.  This sample excludes in-hospital deaths 
and discharges to hospice, long-term acute care, and inpatient rehabilitation, resulting in a 
sample of 4,448,479 hospital discharges.   
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Despite the fact that the hospitalizations and home health admissions for the 15% of Medicare 
beneficiaries in Medicare Advantage plans are not recorded, this is a comprehensive record of 
hospitalizations and home health admissions for Americans over 65 given that 95% are covered by 
Medicare.   
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Variables  
The key dependent variables for the sample of home health admissions include several 
measures of resource intensity of home health services and rehospitalization rates as an 
outcome measure of quality. The resource intensity measures include the total number of 
visits, weighted by the skill level of the provider conducting the visit,8 the proportion of 
visits by skill type (skilled nursing, home health aide, and all therapists), the length of 
service (number of days between the first and last visit), and the frequency of visits 
(weighted visits divided by length of service).  We measure resource utilization within 
the first 60-day episode of home health care as only 10% of these index episodes of care 
are recertified for additional episodes beyond the first 60 days on service.   
 
We identify readmissions rates to be our key quality related outcome measure for our 
sample home health admissions following a hospital discharge.  Given the fact that 
avoiding rehospitalization is a primary goal of home health care among those who enter 
home health from the hospital, readmission is generally viewed as the critical outcome of 
home health.  Moreover, mortality rates are too low in this population to be measured as a 
reliable outcome. Shaughnessy and colleagues (2002) found hospitalization rates after 
home health admission to be a valid and significant indicator of quality of home health 
care.  We measure rehospitalizations by linking home health admission claims to all 
hospital discharge claims. We classified the timing of rehospitalizations into 60-day 
intervals following a hospital discharge (0-60 days and 60 to 120 days).  For 
                                                 
8 There are six different home health care visit types: skilled nursing, physical therapy, occupational 
therapy, speech language pathology, medical social services, and home health aide.  Since these represent 
different intensities of care and, hence different costs of resource use, we adjusted the count of all visits for 
the relative value of each unit type (Welch, Wennberg and Welch 1996). The relative value is based on the 
federally reported relative value units (RVUs) (Hsiao et al 1988).   
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rehospitalization measures, subjects are censored in the rare event of death and after their 
first rehospitalization.   
 
For the sample of all hospital discharges, to achieve the goal of assessing the implications 
of home health care, we measure the rate of home health admissions, rehospitalization 
rates and total Medicare expenditures.  Our unique dataset allows us to determine a home 
health admission by tracking patients admitted to home health, as indicated by a home 
health claim, within 3 days of hospital discharge. Rehospitalizations are estimated as 
above for the home health sample.  Medicare expenditures were defined as the amount 
that Medicare actually paid for care as recorded in claims records. We included 
Medicare-financed care in inpatient, skilled nursing facility (SNF), and home health.  
Because payments for these types of care are made for care received over an interval of 
days, we assign the expenditure to the 60-day interval associated with the first day of that 
episode of care and define expenditures for the intervals 0-60 days and 60 to 120 days.    
All expenditures are expressed in constant 2006 dollars.  For completeness, we also 
measure Medicare expenditures for the home health sample. 
 
In addition to our key explanatory variable indicating which states have CON regulations, 
our control variables are at the patient, hospital, county, and state level.  Patient level 
variables (demand shifters) include age, gender, race and measures of patient clinical 
severity, using 104 diagnoses for the hospitalization variables and 28 patient 
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comorbidities variables.9  Hospital-level variables (supply shifters) include ownership 
status, medical school affiliation, number of licensed hospital beds, and hospital CON 
regulation status.  County-level variables capture both demand and supply shifters.  These 
variables include factors that capture potential variation across counties in the availability 
of both acute and post-acute outlets (i.e., hospital beds per 100 persons, nursing home 
beds per 100 persons), HMO enrollment rate, population size, density, urban status 
education, income, and percentage of population over age 65.  
 
Analysis 
We conducted fixed-effect multivariable regression analysis of home health resource 
utilization, rehospitalization, and expenditures, as a function of CON and the covariates 
related to use and outcomes.  The model used varied by outcome.  We used ordinary least 
squares for home health services: number of visits, length of service, frequency of visits, 
and percent of visits by provider type.  We used a GEE logistic model for the estimation 
of home health admissions following hospital discharge. We estimated a fully interacted 
discrete time Cox model for rehospitalizations. For Medicare expenditures, because of 
the cluster of zero expenditures and the heavy right tail, we estimated a two-part model 
where the first part was a logistic GEE and the second part was a generalized linear 
model with a log link and gamma family.  In all regressions we adjusted standard errors 
for clustering at the HRR level.  Model results are all expressed in terms of their marginal 
effects. 
 
                                                 
9 We track the 103 most frequent DRGs as code them as categorical variables while characterizing the 
remaining 10% into an “other” category.  In addition, we have dummy variables for 28 comorbidities using 
the Elixhauser method (Elixhauser et al., 1998).    
17 
 
To better understand the contribution of adjustments for observable and unobservable 
factors we estimate the marginal effect of CON without any adjustment, with adjustments 
for observable factors without fixed effects, and with HRR fixed effects.  One potential 
limitation of the fixed-effect model is that, while improving the internal validity of our 
estimates, the identification comes from those HRRs that cross state boundaries.  These 
33 HRRs represent approximately 13% of the full sample.  Nevertheless, to assess the 
external validity of this subset, we show the adjusted subsample marginal effects for 
comparison to the adjusted effects for the whole sample. 
 
RESULTS 
Our primary sample consists of 522,232 hospital-to-home health transitions in 2006.  
29.6% of these transitions occurred in CON states. From Table 1, we see that home 
health admissions in CON states only differ slightly from non-CON states in terms of 
patient characteristics, with patients in CON states more likely to be older, female, black, 
and have heart failure and diabetes.  There were more meaningful differences in the 
hospitals and market characteristics.  Hospitals in CON states were more likely to be non-
profit, larger, and affiliated to a medical school.  Markets were similar in terms of 
education and income levels, but CON states were less densely populated, had more 
hospital beds available, were more likely to have CON for hospitals, and were more 
likely to hospitalize patients in their last six months of life. 
 
The home health practice pattern differences between CON and non-CON states are 
shown in Table 2, highlighting a few significant differences in home health practice 
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patterns across these states.  The number of visits is essentially the same between CON 
and non-CON states. (Unadjusted means are 10.59 visits vs. 10.71 for a difference of -
0.125 visits, p-value=0.012).  This difference remains small and statistically insignificant 
across adjustment strategies.  The length of service is slightly longer in CON states by an 
unadjusted 0.673 days (p-value=0.336), but this difference shrinks and becomes 
statistically insignificant in the adjusted models.  However, the frequency of visits is 
significantly less in CON states across specifications.  In the final HRR fixed-effects 
specification there are 0.011 (p-value<0.001) fewer visits per day in CON states. There 
are also important differences in the skill mix where the proportion of visits by skilled 
nursing is 0.049 less and by home health aides is 0.028 more in CON states suggesting a 
lower intensity of skilled human capital in CON states.    
 
The probability of discharge from the hospital to a home health agency is 1.5 percentage 
points lower in CON vs. non-CON states (last column of the first row of results in Table 
4).  This 12.6% decline in the rate of discharge to home health is statistically significant, 
large, and robust to our alternative specifications.  There is little difference between the 
overall adjusted result and the adjusted result in the subsample.  The adjusted result is 
about twice the size of the unadjusted result, and the fixed effect result.  
 
The effect of entry regulation on rehospitalization rates is presented in Table 3.  The top 
panel reports results for hospitalized patients discharged to home health and the bottom 
panel reports results for all hospitalized patients.  Within the home health cohort, the final 
fixed-effects model shows no statistically significant differences in rehospitalization 
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rates.  In the first 60 days after hospital discharge rehospitalization rates are higher by 
only 0.51 percentage points (or 3.0%), but then are lower by 0.34 percentage points 
(3.9%) in the subsequent 60 days. This suggests that home health care in non-CON states 
may have a small influence in delaying rehospitalizations.  
 
The other specifications in this table offer some additional suggestive evidence.  The 
fixed-effects specification brings the marginal effects closer to zero particularly in the 
first 60 days suggesting observed shortcomings of home health in CON states may be an 
artifact of geographic variations.  Adjustments for observable factors also bring the 
results closer to zero.  We see this in the comparison between the unadjusted 
specification and the adjusted specification.  The key driving factors here are variables 
adjusting for patient severity suggesting that home health in CON states attracts a more 
severe patient mix.   
 
In the sample of all hospitalized patients, rehospitalization rates are slightly higher in 
CON states with a marginal effect of .79 percentage points (or 4.7%) (p-value=0.057) in 
the first 60 days. The result is stable with and without the fixed effect adjustment, 
however the effect may not be generalizable to the entire sample because the adjusted 
subsample effect is much stronger than the adjusted effect in the full sample.   
 
Medicare expenditures are not statistically different between CON and non-CON states in 
the fixed-effects specification.  This is true within the sample of home health admissions 
and among all hospital discharges.  It is notable that in the unadjusted analysis, 
20 
 
expenditure in CON states for patients discharged to home health is nearly $500 higher 
than in non-CON states, but is reduced close to zero after adjusting for patient mix.  Costs 
are lower in states with CON laws in the adjusted subsample and go up slightly with 
fixed effects suggesting that the $123 cost difference for 120 days post discharge 
estimated in the adjusted specification may be a lower bound and that costs within the 
home health sample may be higher in CON states.  For Medicare expenditures among all 
hospital discharges, costs are lower in the first 30 days in CON states, but this effect is 
not statistically significant in the most saturated fixed-effects specification.  The lower 
costs in the first 60 days after a hospital discharge is primarily a result of the lower use of 
home health care services in CON states and most of these costs are offset by higher costs 
beyond 60 days that can be attributed to the higher rates of rehospitalization. 
 
DISCUSSION 
States use a one-size-fits-all regulatory approach across different segments of the health 
care industry. Regulation of resource utilization, such as CON laws, while used 
predominantly to regulate capital expansions in the hospital sector, is commonly used in 
labor-intensive environments such as the home health sector.  Instead of regulating 
capital investment, home health CONs take the form of entry restrictions.10 As a 
consequence, it is nearly impossible for a potential home health entrant to demonstrate 
“need”, as incumbent agencies are not constrained by capacity and face few hurdles when 
it comes to expansion of services. Therefore, not surprisingly, CON regulation of home 
                                                 
10 This is not to say that the reasoning behind hospital CON makes practical sense. Many states dropped 
their hospital CONs as it created wasteful bureaucratic pressure and most importantly, failed to slow the 
growth in health care spending (Thorpe 1999, Salkever 2000, Field 2007). 
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health leads to concentrated markets with about half the number of agencies compared 
with states where entry is not regulated using CON. 
 
We find home health care in CON states to be less resource intensive (lower frequency of 
visits and lower skill mix), yet we did not find meaningful differences in quality based on 
the fact that there were no detectible differences in rehospitalization rates among patients 
admitted to home health from the hospital.  Hence, the quality effect that we 
hypothesized was not confirmed, although the level of resource intensity could be viewed 
as the dimension of “quality” on which home health agencies compete.  If this is the case, 
the stronger intensity of resource use in CON states did not translate into improved 
quality outcomes.  On the other hand, we found no evidence that regulation in home 
health lowers the rate of hospital readmissions or resource intensity of home health care 
as suggested by the view that limiting the number of home health agencies through CON 
focuses monitoring efforts and results in better care.  On net, it is possible that the anti-
competitive and monitoring effects of CON regulation are canceling each other out.   
 
While the delivery of home health services to those admitted does not appear to be much 
different in CON states, overall health service delivery is different because CON 
regulation is associated with 12.6% fewer home health admissions following hospital 
discharge.  This lower rate of home health admissions is accompanied by a slightly 
higher rate of hospital readmission among all hospital discharges.  Moreover, Medicare 
expenditures overall are similar over 120 days but lower in CON states initially.  This 
suggests that the use of more home health episodes is costly (intensive margins), but 
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because a higher rate of use of home health lowers the likelihood of rehospitalization 
(extensive margins) and the associated expenditures, this home health use is not 
associated with a detectible overall change in Medicare expenditures.   
 
CON may not reduce the performance of home health agencies among the patients seen 
by home health, but because home health in CON is used less frequently following 
hospital admission, CON has negative implications for the broader health care system.  
Although there are no overall differences in total Medicare expenditures, patients are 
unlikely to be indifferent between the two models of care.  A system with fewer 
hospitalizations would seem preferable, all else equal.  Thus, extensive margin 
implications may be more important when considering the implications of entry 
regulation.  
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Appendix A: List of HRRs that span more than one state, the number of patients in our sample, and the 
percent of population under CON 
 
Hospital Referral Region Non-CON State(s) CON State N %CON 
Albany MA NY 34,285 94% 
Allentown PA NJ 27,027 5% 
Billings WY MT 9,045 91% 
Dothan GA / FL AL 9,860 94% 
Durham VA NC 24,665 82% 
Erie PA NY 14,415 11% 
Evansville IN / OH KY 12,127 8% 
Fort Smith OK AR 5,865 87% 
Jacksonville FL GA 28,023 13% 
Jonesboro MO AR 6,094 94% 
Kingsport VA TN 8,929 53% 
Lebanon NH VT 4,569 13% 
Louisville OH KY 31,702 84% 
Morgantown PA WV 9,260 97% 
New Haven CT NY 26,509 5% 
Norfolk VA NC 19,784 8% 
Paducah IN KY 10,487 89% 
Pensacola FL AL 15,533 9% 
Philadelphia PA NJ 63,470 15% 
Pittsburgh PA WV 45,421 9% 
Portland OR WA 16,364 24% 
Roanoke VA WV 15,576 17% 
Salisbury DE MD 8,523 60% 
Sayre PA NY 4,527 17% 
Slidell LA MS 2,593 12% 
Spokane ID WA 20,044 81% 
Springfield MO AR 15,914 17% 
Tallahassee FL GA 11,456 60% 
Texarkana OK / TX AR 5,864 5% 
Wilmington DE MD 15,869 13% 
Winchester VA WV 6,135 20% 
Winston-Salem VA NC 17,955 96% 
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